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Abstract
This spring the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. (Exchange or NYSE) completed an
historic restructuring. On March 7, 2006, the NYSE completed its merger with
Archipelago Holdings Inc. (Archipelago), a publicly traded electronic trading platform.
As a result, the old NYSE itself became the New York Stock Exchange LLC, a wholly
owned subsidiary of NYSE Group, Inc. (NYSE Group). The former members, or seat
holders, of the NYSE received one of three forms of consideration: all cash, all stock in
NYSE Group, or a package of cash and stock. The NYSE Group then allowed those
former members to offer their shares to the public in a secondary offering.
Because the NYSE was a not-for-profit corporation, the merger was also a change in
organizational form. The change from nonprofit to for-profit, or demutualization, has
mostly been viewed as a long-overdue response to new, on-line competition from
“electronic communications networks” (ECN’s). But there has been little assessment of
the strengths or efficiencies of the nonprofit form of the exchange. This paper presents
the possibility that the NYSE’s choice of form was an efficient solution to a classic
“lemons” problem, in which misinformation from bad issuing firms (firms whose shares
trade on the exchange) could drive out good issuing firms. We apply a robust theory of
nonprofits in which the highest demanding consumers of a nonrival good organize the
production of that good.
In this case, investment bankers and other financial intermediaries organized to produce
liquidity. The resulting nonprofit was the former NYSE, which was able to align issuing
firms’ incentives to disclose with those of investors. Banker-owners of the NYSE acted
as gatekeepers to the exchange, screening issuing firms through an extensive “due
diligence” process, providing capital via underwriting, and connecting issuing firm
insiders to one another via initial public offering (IPO) allocations. Over a period of
many decades this system maintained an equilibrium in which issuing firms, big and
small investors, and exchange members could participate with relative ease, transparency
and fairness in the exchange. The shift to a for-profit corporation will have a significant,
and potentially deleterious, impact on this equilibrium as it breaks up the longstanding
components of the nonprofit system.
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I.

Introduction
On March 7, 2006, the New York Stock Exchange announced the completion of

its merger with publicly traded Archipelago Holdings, Inc., thus finishing the first major
step towards its transformation from a nonprofit membership organization to a standard
for-profit corporation.1 The decision to change organizational form - to “demutualize” caps a decade-long trend among stock exchanges around the world (Lee, 1998). The
arguments in favor of demutualization offered in the scholarly and popular literature are
varied. They typically contend that a for-profit firm is better able to make new
investments, especially in technology, and that for-profits are more responsive to
heightened competition from other exchanges. It is also argued that, by placing the assets
of an exchange in a corporation whose shares itself are traded, the competitive pressures
of the capital markets will drive the new entity to more efficient behavior than that of the
“clubby,” insular - and outdated - nonprofit.
But few have considered the possibility that the NYSE in its nonprofit form was
an efficient organization. Yet, despite dramatic changes in its surrounding environment
the NYSE maintained that form for more than 200 years, undergoing only moderate
structural change in response to periodic crises. Right up to its debut as a publicly traded
for-profit, the NYSE remained the single largest and most prestigious exchange in the
world (Hughes and Authers, 2006). We wish to consider whether or not that stability of
form was a rational response to a so-called “lemons” problem. The lemons problem was
stated in its classic form by Akerlof (1970) who argued that asymmetric information
between buyers and sellers in the market for used cars would allow bad cars to drive out
good cars over time. At the NYSE, the potential for a lemons problem exists because of
1

Form 8-K, NYSE Group Inc., March 7, 2006.
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the difficulty in extracting truthful information about firms whose shares trade on the
NYSE (Issuing Firms) and then persuading investors of that truthfulness.
To analyze the nonprofit NYSE as the solution to an information problem, we
apply a theory that views a nonprofit as a consumer-owned entity. In particular, we
describe a general model of nonprofits in which the highest demanding consumers of a
non-rival good organize themselves to produce that good together. In the case of the
NYSE the non-rival good is “liquidity,” which we define as the ability to act in the
market as a price-taker and which provides enormous benefits to Issuing Firms and
investors. The high demanders are financial intermediaries; thus, we focus our attention
on investment banks for the purposes of understanding the lemons problem. As
intermediaries between large investors and firms seeking to issue securities, banks have
special access to information from issuing firms.
How does a nonprofit NYSE, organized by investment bankers to produce
liquidity, overcome its lemons problem? We describe two mechanisms that bankers
might employ. First, during the listing process, bankers research prospective issuers and
screen out bad firms. A second mechanism, which has been observed in venture capital
(VC) deals (Kuan, 2005), is the exchange of “hostages” to motivate truthful disclosure of
information by insiders at issuing firms. Insiders always know more about their firms
than outside bankers no matter how sophisticated the diligence process. Information
quality is always a potential problem, since insiders may wish to misrepresent the
financial condition of their firms.2 As underwriters, bankers allocate shares of an IPO to
the insiders of other listed firms. These IPO allocations typically come with an
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The literature on the problem of inside managers taking advantage of outside investors is vast and reaches
back to Smith and Marx. But the classic statement is Berle and Means (1932). For a recent review of the
problem see Bratton (2001).
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expectation that the shares be held for some period of time (a “lock-up” period), Internetbubble behavior notwithstanding. This lock-up served a dual purpose, stabilizing the
stock price of a new issue and creating mutual vulnerabilities to bad information among
insiders of issuing firms. That is, if the CEO of an issuing firm were to lie about his firm
to the investing public, insiders at other listed firms who own shares in his firm, i.e.
peers, would suffer as well. While this may not seem a large deterrent, and does not
perhaps rise to the level of hostage taking in VC financing, we believe there are
indications that scrutiny by one’s peers matters.
During the 200-year history of the NYSE’s operation as a nonprofit, first as a
membership association and later as a formal nonprofit corporation, the Exchange’s
members3 carefully decided which firms could trade on the Exchange and then extracted
hostages in order to motivate firms to disclose information truthfully. With the
demutualization of the NYSE now complete, the era of the banker-owner is at an end.
What does a for-profit NYSE portend? We argue that as bankers relinquish ownership of
the Exchange they also give up control of the Exchange and will thus also give up their
formal role as gatekeepers. The for-profit Exchange will assume the role of gatekeeper.
But if the business model of existing for-profit exchanges like Archipelago are any guide,
a for-profit exchange, which profits directly from trading volume, is unlikely to be as
3

For the purposes of this paper we elide whether there is a significant difference between the period of
investment banking dominance of the Exchange and the pre-banker dominant period of the Exchange. As
one history of the earliest activity of the Exchange demonstrates, the Exchange (then called the New York
Stock and Exchange Board) itself served as gatekeeper for new listings during that earlier period. (Banner
1998 at 127-128). As far back as 1869 the Exchange had created listing standards assuring investors that
they had accurate information regarding the capital structure of firms. (Mahoney 1997 at 1461-2). We
assume here for the sake of argument that a form of hostage taking has prevailed during at least the
investment banking dominant period. There is some evidence that it was in fact the rise to prominence of
the investment banks’ role in listing securities, complete by 1900, rather than later federalization of
disclosure requirements, that was key to the establishment of a credible modern disclosure regime. (De
Long 1990; Mahoney 1997 at 1469-70). In fact, more detailed historical work may demonstrate that the
modern hostage system emerged only after trial and error. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the Exchange
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selective as bankers, who profited only indirectly from trading profits (Karmel, 2002 at
367). But selection is only part of the NYSE’s success. Unless a for-profit exchange can
also facilitate hostage exchange, through IPO allocations, firms’ incentive to disclose will
never be as great as under nonprofit ownership of the NYSE. Without hostages
motivating issuers to disclose,4 the quality and reliability of information they provide will
deteriorate and a lemons problem could potentially reemerge.

II.

Literature on Exchange Demutualization
Much of the literature on stock exchange demutualization focuses on various

perceived weaknesses of the non-profit mutual organization.5 According to this
literature, decision-making at a nonprofit exchange is problematic because nonprofit
decisions require consensus (Aggarwal, 2002), respond to a median voter which shifts as
membership diversifies (Hart and Moore, 1996; Macey and O’Connor, 2005), or produce
an increasingly insular, “clubby” membership (Bradley, 2001). Demutualization should
bring about better, faster decisions as the for-profit responds to the market for corporate
control (Bradley, 2001), by investing in new technology, for example (Aggarwal, 2002).
The timing of demutualization is largely seen as being brought about by new competition

had to weather quite volatile periods in its early years as non-repeat players behaved opportunistically. For
detailed discussion of the hostage mechanism in the modern era see discussion in Part IV.D. Infra.
4
It should go without saying that there is little evidence that the agency and other problems that cause
opportunistic behavior by firms’ senior insiders have diminished as the Exchange has moved towards
demutualization. See, for example, the recent outbreak of manipulation of stock options, particularly in the
high tech sector.
5
Lee (1998) provides a descriptive catalogue of recent stock market demutualizations around the world.
On the world of emerging alternative trading systems see Karmel (2002).
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from ECN’s,6 but also by an increase in trading volume internationally, the integration of
capital markets globally, and decimalization (Karmel, 2002).
Notes of caution have been sounded, however, as the merits of the nonprofit form
are acknowledged. For instance, the nonprofit exchange is thought to be more responsive
to regulation (Cox, 2000; Macey and O’Connor, 2005). It may also be that certain rules,
including high listing standards and a difficult delisting process, helped firms that list on
the NYSE to signal their quality and commitment (Rock, 2002; Macey and O’Connor,
2005).
We depart from the existing literature on demutualization by considering the
possibility that the non-profit form actually created important efficiencies that will be lost
upon demutualization. We view the nonprofit member firm as a more efficient form of
organization than the newly emerging for-profit exchanges. We speculate later on why
an entity would choose to demutualize when doing so would be inefficient. But we do
note here that, in practice, the move to demutualize was less straightforward than the
literature would suggest. That is, if demutualization were in fact more efficient, why has
it taken so long to implement? The possibility of alternative trading systems based on
computerized networks first emerged in the 1960s. The argument that the private clublike form of the Exchange was “archaic” was vetted in the 1930s (Douglas cited in Loss
and Seligman, 2004). Yet, the first exchange to demutualize was Sweden’s Stockholm
Stock Exchange in 1993 (Karmel, 2002). As early as 1999, NYSE President Richard
“Dick” Grasso testified to Congress that he was in favor of a shift to the for-profit form
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ECN’s are electronic trading platforms that allow buyers and sellers to match orders directly without
routing the order to a broker-dealer (Nasdaq) or specialist (NYSE). The Nasdaq is an “alternative trading
system” because it is simply a network of broker-dealers without a trading floor or specialists. Arguments
for an ECN include the possibility of faster execution, greater transparency and better pricing. Archipelago
owns and operates a major ECN.
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and that the Board of the Exchange had already begun the process.7 Yet the NYSE
delayed the change, “apparently because of internal tensions” (Coffee, 2002). It took
another seven years and a change in leadership to accomplish demutualization.8 One
explanation, of course, is that the “entrenched” interests of “insular” Exchange members
delayed the inevitable.9 In fact, when the move to demutualize was finally made in the
wake of the ouster of Grasso, a frequent view expressed in the media was that Grasso
himself had blocked the reform in order to protect those entrenched interests.10 But in his
Congressional testimony, in fact, Grasso raised many of the same arguments as those
found in the scholarly literature. If the presumed leading defender of insular member
interests at the Exchange was in favor of for-profit status yet was unable to carry out such
a reform, an alternative explanation for the failure to complete the transition much earlier
than 2006 is required. We contend that the nonprofit form benefited members, as well as
the Issuing Firms and investors they served, and thus preserving that structure was
rational.11

7

Demutualization was “critically needed to assure the continued competitiveness and position of the
NYSE as the world's pre-eminent equity market” (Grasso, 1999).
8
Significant shifts in NSYE governance structure have been rare. Stability has been the norm. The two
most notable “constitutional moments” for the Exchange, prior to this year’s transition, occurred in 1938
and 1971. In the wake of the Depression era Whitney Scandal the Exchange opened up its Board of
Governors to directors representing the investing public. After the “back office” crisis of the late 1960s the
Exchange made a formal move to non-profit corporate status under New York law. See Teweles and
Bradley (1998). For a discussion of the Exchange’s ability to adopt new modern standards over time, see
Mahoney 1997.
9
“That the NYSE is making this transition 2 1/2 years after Grasso resigned is extraordinary when one
considers the vigor with which observers said he resisted change in order to preserve specialist
sovereignty,” (Lazaroff, 2006).
10
The “uproar over the former chairman and chief executive's hefty pay package was essential in forcing
change on an insular institution,” (Lazaroff, 2006).
11
We can, of course, only speculate as to the reasons for the delay. If Coffee (2002) is right that Grasso’s
push for a change was met with internal tension, that tension may have reflected debate over the relative
value of retaining the hostage system versus the potential for short term gains by selling out one’s
membership.
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III.

A consumer-owned model of nonprofit organization
While much of the scholarly literature on nonprofits mirrors the popular notion

that they are inefficient, we apply a model that shows how nonprofits can be
economically efficient, even achieving first-best efficiency (Kuan, 2001). In this model,
the highest demanding consumers of a nonrival good organize to produce the good.12
Because high demanders are able to organize, they also have more information about
demand than a for-profit entrepreneur. This informational advantage allows more
efficient price discrimination and is the source of economic efficiency. The following is a
simple numerical example to illustrate the basic idea, which we then apply to the NYSE.
Suppose a nonrival good of a certain quality costs $1000 to produce. (Assume
higher quality costs more, lower quality less). Demand consists of two “high” types and
ten “low” types. High types have a high willingness to pay; in this case, both high types
are willing to pay $500 each for the good. Since the good is non-rival, their combined
$1000 is exactly enough to pay for the good. Low types have a low willingness to pay; in
this case, each low type is willing to pay $10. Together, the low types are only willing to
pay $100.
Assume that a profit-maximizing entrepreneur knows the demand curve, i.e. two
high types willing to pay $500 each and ten low types willing to pay $10 each, but he
cannot distinguish high types from low types. According to canonical price
discrimination models, the entrepreneur must produce a lower quality product that sells at
a price all can afford, or produce two goods, a high quality-high priced one and a low
quality-low-priced one. In either case, the entrepreneur makes a profit, and the high types

12

A nonrival good is one where one party’s use of it does not diminish its value to others.
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come away with some consumer surplus. That is, the entrepreneur and the high types
share the surplus.
Assume also that high types know the demand curve; in particular, they know that
they are the only two high types. Now suppose that the two high types have the ability to
work together and produce the good themselves. Together, they put in $500 each and
produce a $1000 quality good. Since the two high types know each other and their
willingness to pay, they also know that the other ten consumers are low types. That is,
they have perfect information about demand, something the entrepreneur did not have.
They charge the low types $10 to consume the good, which they then keep. They get the
entire surplus, in this case, $100 in total or $50 each. Observe that this firm has the
appearance of a nonprofit firm. Revenues for the good are $120 ($10 each from 12
consumers). The cost of producing the good is $1000. The high types make up the
difference, or $880. This amount appears to be a donation when, in fact, it comes from
the high types’ willingness to pay.
Since the high types have perfect information about demand, they reap the total
surplus and can never do better by buying from a for-profit entrepreneur. What is needed
for nonprofit organization, however, is 1) non-rivalry in the good and 2) the ability of
high types to organize around their information. If the two high types did not know each
other, or could not come together to pool their resources, then the nonprofit firm would
not arise. In practice, these obstacles can be enormous. In the model derived by Kuan
(2001) wealthy members of “Society” who socialized regularly produced operas and used
age-old rules of etiquette to extract contributions. Note that these social pressures were
essential to financing production and to economic efficiency, and a for-profit
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entrepreneur, who would have been an outsider, could not have used them. Thus, even if
the entrepreneur had information about wealthy individuals, perhaps from the Social
Registry, he would still need a mechanism for extracting payment. Society mavens have
such a mechanism; entrepreneurs do not.

IV.

The NYSE as a consumer owned nonprofit
How does a model of nonprofit organization - developed in the context of opera

companies - apply to the NYSE? In the stylized model above, a nonprofit forms to
produce a nonrival good using mechanisms to extract contributions from high types. In
the benign case of operas, opera performances are the nonrival good, and long-standing
social rules serve as a mechanism among the wealthy to get rich patrons to pay their fair
share. In the case of the NYSE, liquidity is a nonrival good produced by financial
intermediaries who use a number of mechanisms to elicit truthful information from
insiders at Issuing Firms.
A. Liquidity
A stock exchange provides a marketplace for arms-length trading of securities; a
marketplace that creates liquidity and all the benefits that liquidity brings. A world
without such a marketplace would resemble today’s private equity market where a small
group of professionals raise funds with money from wealthy individuals and institutional
investors. Typically, private equity firms include buyout funds that buy distressed firms
and install new management, and venture capital firms that finance risky start-ups.
Buyout funds purchase all of the outstanding shares of publicly traded firms, thus
eliminating the separation of ownership and control enabling direct management of firm
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operations by the new owners. Venture capital firms use a variety of contractual
constraints to control the managers of the startup firms they back. The wealthy
individuals and institutional investors who invest in these private equity funds as limited
partners of the professional managers lack an impersonal and liquid market for their
investments. To exit a private equity investment before the prescribed date (usually ten
years), an investor must find a buyer for her investment. A secondary market for these
limited partnership interests in now exists, but its available capital is still relatively small.
In addition, general partners of private equity funds discourage limited partners from
considering such an alternative exit (Sheahan, 2005). The absence of liquidity, of course,
negatively impacts asset prices, even in publicly traded securities (Reinganum, 1990;
Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara, 2002; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; and Butler,
Grullon and Weston, 2002). Thus, the sale of limited partnership interests in private
equity funds for pennies on the dollar is not unusual.13
In contrast to the severe constraints of such a private market, an ideal public
market has prices that change smoothly, that can be observed almost continuously, and
provides brokers, specialists or market makers who facilitate finding a buyer. The
specialists and market makers are willing, even required, to serve as a buyer or seller of
last resort. Also, with many buyers and sellers participating in the market, prices reflect
the combined knowledge of these participants.14 Finally, recent corporate accounting
scandals notwithstanding, NYSE-traded firms make regular and, far more frequently than
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Partner, secondary venture fund, Interview with one of the authors (2005).
The NYSE requires even heavily traded listed companies to have a minimum of 500 shareholders while
companies conducting an IPO must have 2000 shareholders (Sec. 102.00, Listed Company Manual, NYSE,
2006).
14
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not, accurate public disclosures. By contrast, venture capital funded start-ups are
extremely risky, tight-lipped, and unpredictable.
The ease of trading and abundant information that an NYSE listing brings to
individual investors has helped generate wide participation in the stock market by
individual, so-called “retail,” investors. This widespread participation increases liquidity
and, therefore, benefits the firms whose shares trade on the NYSE. Thus the NYSE, as an
intermediary institution, serves investors and listing firms by creating price enhancing
liquidity. We will argue in the next sections, that the NYSE does this by ensuring
information is reliable and truthful thus, solving a “lemons” problem.
B. Owners
According to a consumer-owned model, the owners of a nonprofit are also the
consumers with the most to gain. While liquidity benefits all investors and publicly
traded firms, the biggest beneficiaries are, in principal, easily identified as NYSE “seat
holders” or members. Unfortunately, seat holders are identifiable to us in principal only
because, in practice, membership rolls are private information. Nevertheless, press
estimates and De Long’s (1990) historical account suggest that investment banks
dominate membership decisions.
There are members with other functional expertise, however, such as brokerdealers, who service retail customers. By providing millions of small investors access to
the NYSE, broker-dealers provide a valuable component of liquidity. Specialists are
firms that manage the trading activity for issuing firms. Each issuing firm selects a single
specialist firm, giving that specialist a monopoly over transactions in that issuing firm’s
stock. A lucrative business, specialists also provide a valuable service to the Exchange,
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acting as buyer and seller of last resort. As such, the specialist uses her own account to
ensure that prices move in small increments. While maintaining price quality can be risky
- stock market crashes have put many a specialist out of business - it also contributes to
investor confidence. On ECN’s, in contrast, where customers’ buy and sell orders are
matched with each other, thin after hours trading has produced large, unsettling price
discontinuities.
Each of these three types of members of the NYSE serves an important function
for the nonprofit. Certain mechanisms hold these fiercely competitive firms together
within the Exchange, constraining their behavior for the production of liquidity, the
nonrival good that they can each benefit from. Among these mechanisms are internal
rules and multi-lateral contracts. However, for the purposes of this paper, we focus on the
information problem associated with liquidity and the use of hostages to support a
solution to that problem.
C. The “lemons” problem and the role of information quality
There are a number of inputs into the production of liquidity. Typically, the
existing literature explores the positive effect that regulation has had on expanding the
volume of trading on equity markets and the positive role that an independent judiciary
has on enforcing privately negotiated contracts. Less attention has been paid, however, to
the effect that quality of information has on stock markets. In the wake of the most
recent corporate scandals, where, for example, at Enron fraudulent disclosures were used
to cheat investors, we believe that providing information remains a problem for
exchanges even with regulation and a supportive contract law regime.
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As suggested above, Akerlof (1970) argued that the used-car market suffers from
a similar information problem. In this market, information about the quality of a faulty
used car, a so-called “lemon,” is indistinguishable from the information about a nonfaulty used car because of the information asymmetry between buyers and sellers. Thus,
buyers must apply a lemon discount to all cars that depresses the price for good and bad
used cars alike and thus, in turn, discourages owners of non-faulty used cars from
entering the market. The result is that, like Gresham’s Law (bad money drives out good),
lemons drive out non-lemons, in a race to the bottom.
In the context of stock exchanges, Macey and O’Connor (2005) recognize the
potential for opportunism and the role of the NYSE’s self-regulatory arm in countering it.
They argue that it is important to recognize the difference between the ex ante
willingness of an issuer “to opt into a set of efficient legal rules to prevent or impede later
diversions of wealth from investors” (id. at 576) such as those required by a demanding
self regulated exchange and the ability of an issuer, ex post, to take advantage of a world
which offers multiple listing venues some of which may be indifferent to such
opportunistic behavior. Thus, “management has an incentive to renege on the agreements
it has made with investors whenever possible. In today's environment of multivenue
trading, the problem of such ex post opportunistic behavior looms quite large.” (Id).
Issuing Firms have much to gain by misrepresenting information, whether that
information comes from accounting records, clinical tests, or business prospects. Recent
history has shown that there are myriad ways to deceive the investing public and myriad
incentives to do so. Thus, when it comes to the production of quality information, the
problem is one of eliciting truthful disclosure from Issuing Firms.
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D. Mechanisms
How do owners of the NYSE elicit the truth? We focus on investment banks
because they have the most information about Issuing Firms, and as intermediaries
between firms and investors, probably also have the most to lose from deceit.
We identify two methods that bankers use to overcome information asymmetry: gatekeeping and hostages.
1. Gate-keeping
Bankers gather information about a prospective issuer through two distinct
processes. First, bankers select among potential candidates those firms they believe meet
a certain quality standard and are ready to consider “going public.” Second, the lead
underwriters chosen to lead a stock offering conduct an intensive “due diligence” or
investigation process, which can often take months, to verify the quality and accuracy of
the information that the issuing firm will disclose to potential investors. During the due
diligence process, bankers work with issuers to prepare a registration statement, including
a prospectus to be provided to potential investors, containing that information that is filed
with the SEC and the NYSE. The registration statement must contain all material
information necessary for a reasonable investor to decide whether or not to purchase the
offered security, including financial statements prepared by management that are audited
by an outside accounting firm. The registration process gives bankers an opportunity to
evaluate the management and business prospects of an issuing firm, and also to build
long-term personal relationships with managers. Obtaining information through firsthand contact with firms is a time-tested method. For instance, De Long (1990) describes
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the early 20th century role of J.P. Morgan’s “men” in improving firm management
through Morgan’s investment banking relationship with such firms.

2. Hostage exchange
To solve the lemons problem requires more than gate-keeping, however. Keeping
issuers honest is an on-going problem. To confront this problem we believe that bankers
engage in the exchange of hostages. Bankers use the IPO process to extract hostages from
issuer insiders. These hostages help align the incentive of issuers to disclose with the
need of investors for quality information.
a. Hostages
The idea of using hostage exchange to align incentives is suggested by
Williamson (1996). According to Williamson, in a transaction buyer and seller offer
each other hostages to guarantee against cheating. If the buyer cheats, the seller may
keep the hostage posted by the buyer; if the seller cheats, the buyer keeps the hostage
posted by the seller. Examples of hostages have, in practice, been hard to find, especially
in a buyer-seller context. However, Kuan (2005) offers evidence of hostage exchange
among venture capitalists in the early period of venture capital activity on the east coast.
In that setting, a lead VC’s role as the manager of an investment in a start-up places him
in a position to cheat a less-informed fellow investor. A VC who has a close or
proprietary relationship with an entrepreneur can use the resulting asymmetry to cheat
through shirking or misrepresenting information. In this case, Kuan found, the incentive
to cheat fellow members of a VC syndicate was mitigated by a reciprocal investment that
placed the lead investor in a follower position in a subsequent start-up with fellow VC’s.
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That is, in the first start-up, one VC is the leader and the other VC is the follower. In the
next start-up, the VC’s swap roles. This swapping of leadership roles provides each VC
the opportunity to punish cheating. The result of the hostage exchange is deterrence.
In the VC setting, hostages are effectively generated and thus can be exchanged
because the lead VC is an active manager of its start-up. A lead VC’s efforts influence
business outcomes; therefore, if a lead VC shirks, the start-up suffers. Thus, VC’s know
that the hostage exchange process is significant. At the NYSE, CEO’s and other top
insiders influence the outcome of firms; bankers only obtain quality information from
firms if they can threaten senior insiders. So it is the CEO from whom a hostage must be
extracted, if truthful information about a firm is to be obtained.
b. The IPO process
One way we think bankers extract hostages is to use IPO allocations. When a
corporation decides to conduct a public offering of its securities it will typically contract
with an investment bank to serve as the lead manager of the offering process.15 The lead
manager will usually organize an underwriting syndicate in order to spread the risk of
completing the offering among several investment banks. The lead manager will reap the
largest fees from the offering and has the right to determine the relative size and structure
of the “allocation” of securities. A certain percentage of securities will be allocated to
institutional investors, usually around 70% of the overall offering, with the remaining
30% allocated to retail investors. There are several competing pressures faced by the
lead manager in the allocation process. On the one hand, if the offering is on a “firm
commitment” basis, the underwriting syndicate and the issuer will enter into an
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underwriting agreement obligating the banks to purchase the entire offering amount.
Thus, the banks put their own capital at risk and are under pressure to “build a book” of
investors who indicate an interest in the purchase of the securities once the SEC
registration process is complete. There is also an interest in placing the shares with
investors who are willing to hold them for a relatively long period of time. Issuers
typically view such a shareholder base as easier to manage and the wider market enjoys a
more efficient price because long term, particularly institutional, holders are often in a
better position to monitor managers. For this reason, lead managers impose a penalty on
broker-dealers who place shares with customers who “flip” their allocated shares too
quickly (Johnson and McLaughlin, 1997 at 71-72).
To see how volatile prices can be if large investors also flip, consider the Internet
bubble experience of the late 1990s, when even normally restrained IPO shareholders
began to flip. Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) find that:
In 1996, first-day returns on initial public offerings averaged about 17 percent
(median: 10 percent). In 1999, first-day returns averaged 73 percent (median: 40
percent) before tapering off to 58 percent (median: 30 percent) in 2000. Internet
IPO’s averaged a stunning 89 percent (median: 57 percent) during 1999 and 2000.
These average returns dwarf those from earlier periods and are the most widely
recognized feature of what is now commonly referred to as the “dot-com bubble.”
Similarly, Ritter and Welch (2002) find first day “underpricing” averaged only 7% in the
1980’s, yet shot up to 65% in 1999 and 2000. Prior to this anomalous period, however,
bankers could ordinarily count on allocating shares in new offerings to clients who would
hold those shares for an extended period of time. In that case, those clients might be
risking a sacrifice; over a 5-year period, IPO shares performed below the market
(Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Ritter, 1991).
15

It is technically possible, but relatively unusual, for an issuer to offer its securities without the assistance
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c. IPO allocations as hostages
Allocating IPO shares to clients allows bankers to achieve two goals. Price
stabilization is the first, but creating mutual dependencies is the other. Like interlocking
directorships, IPO allocations create personal and business connections among issuer
insiders. In a rare public disclosure of this practice, Citigroup, the parent company of
investment bank SalomonSmithBarney (SSB), provided a description of the IPO
allocation process to the U.S. House of Representatives in response to a subpoena issued
during a Congressional investigation in 2002. One bank document lists the allocations
made to more than two-dozen people, many of them CEOs at publicly listed firms.16
Under ordinary (non-bubble) circumstances, these CEOs would hold onto their IPO
shares, thus becoming partial owners of the newly listed firm. The CEOs are then
vulnerable to drops in share price caused by insider shirking or fraud. This vulnerability
places the new firm under increased scrutiny by fellow CEOs. Also, to the extent that
fellow CEOs can punish each other for transgressions, perhaps through foreclosure of any
future dealings, this creates an incentive to disclose information.
This interpretation of IPO allocations is, of course, exactly the opposite of what
IPO allocations came to represent, namely a perk. As indicated above, in the late 1990s a
significant increase in the price of IPO shares during the first few days of trading was
almost guaranteed. The most notorious recipients of these unusual allocations were the
so-called “Friends of Frank,” a circle of prominent CEO’s and other senior insiders in
Silicon Valley who regularly received IPO shares from prominent investment banker
Frank Quattrone of CSFB (Joshi, 2003). Because tech boom era stocks consistently

of a financial intermediary such as an investment bank.
16
Jane C. Sherburne, Citigroup, Letter to Hon. Michael G. Oxley and Hon. John J. LaFalce, Committee on
Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Aug. 30, 2002.
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exhibited significant price hikes in the immediate post-IPO period, these allocations were
viewed as more akin to a bribe to win new clients than as a hostage aimed at ensuring
quality disclosure from issuers over a longer period of time.

V.

Discussion and Conclusions
On March 8, 2006, the opening bell at the NYSE was greeted by a mixture of

applause and boos. Announcing the arrival of a publicly traded for-profit NYSE, the
negative reaction came mostly from the exchange’s own floor traders. For them, the
implications of demutualization were clear: an end to their way of life as floor trading is
gradually replaced by on-line order matching. Executives at the NYSE are also being
replaced, one after another, by Archipelago executives. The replacement of the NYSE by
a super-sized Archipelago, and the plans of John Thain, the NYSE Group’s CEO, to
acquire overseas exchanges, is part and parcel of what we predict at the NYSE, namely, a
gradual degradation of quality.
As the world’s premier stock exchange, the NYSE has had imitators around the
world. Yet it has maintained a position of leadership, with the highest valuations, the
largest market capitalization, and the biggest trading volumes, even without the largest
number of issuers.17 Incumbency alone, however, cannot explain this superior
performance, as entrants have tried and failed over time to displace the NYSE. One
explanation for the NYSE’s performance is its higher level of integrity, i.e., its successful
resolution of the lemons problem. One way it may have solved the lemons problem is
through the use of a hostage exchange system embedded within the nonprofit form. For
17

“The market value of companies traded on New York’s floor is $21,000 billion – more than the Tokyo,
London, Nasdaq, Euronext and Deutsche Boers exchanges combined,” (Hughes and Authers, 2006).
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various reasons, including the difficulty of observing the system itself, this solution is
difficult to imitate. It may also be the case that over time those who recognize the
advantage of a hostage based system have moved into other settings, particularly the
private equity world where as suggested, at least as far as the VC environment is
concerned, there is an established hostage exchange process. That leaves the public
trading markets exposed to the potential downside of a slide into a hostage-free world of
commoditized trading.
Under the nonprofit model, exchange-owning bankers had an incentive to be
selective about which firms traded on the NYSE. Solving the lemons problem led to
greater investor confidence and hence liquidity, which in turn meant more and higher
underwriting fees. Increased activity by small individual investors would profit brokerdealers directly rather than investment banks which deal only with issuing firms and large
investors. So limiting the firms that trade on the NYSE to only those who meet certain
listing standards and whose most important managers post hostages benefits bankers
through higher fees from listed firms. Banks thus profit only indirectly from greater
liquidity.
A for-profit exchange, like Archipelago, profits directly from liquidity, charging
investors for each buy or sell transaction. A for-profit exchange benefits only indirectly
from investor confidence that results from solving the lemons problem, so maintaining
the quality of firms and the quality of information is of interest only indirectly. Given
these incentives, we would predict a reduced incentive for the new for-profit NYSE to
maintain informational integrity. In turn, this is likely to lead to an increase in the growth
rate of firms allowed to list and hence an overall decline in investor confidence.
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One question arises from our dire predictions, namely, if the mutual form of
organization is so great, why would the exchange choose to demutualize? One possibility
is that a form of market segregation is now occurring in capital markets. Technological
change is both driven by, and combined with, the rise of institutional investors who value
speed of execution over best price. Thus, with the growth of web-based computing
power, a market for trading as a commodity has opened up. That has created a new form
of competition for the traditional exchanges from the alternative trading systems, first
Nasdaq and then Archipelago, Instinet and others. Rather than beat them, the NYSE has
decided it is best to join them. Meanwhile, private equity and other forms of offexchange trading of financial instruments seem to offer much higher rewards to
individuals who might have gone into traditional investment banking several years ago.
In the off-exchange world it is once again possible to recreate stable hostage systems.
This is particularly the case in markets that are controlled by certain key players with a
first mover advantage: those who build the club, so to speak, get to set the rules. One of
us (Kuan, 2005) has already demonstrated the importance of this approach to
understanding the origins of the highly successful venture capital environment. It now
remains to apply the approach pioneered by Williamson to the emerging frontiers of
finance.
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